Collaboration is a proven approach to building agreement and resolving conflict over
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out in a political (which in this country generally means a democratic) context. Much of the controversy and potential for advancement in natural resource management, including wildlife management, domestically and internationally, relates to the governance of such resources.
After briefly illustrating what we mean by citizen-driven collaboration, we use an historical approach to develop the concept of the ecology of democracy, with particular attention to the conditions that gave rise to the particular democratic species of interest here (namely, citizen-driven collaboration). The primary inspiration for this paper is the authors' practical experience in collaboration, politics, and public policy. We also draw on democratic theory, multi-party negotiation theory, and the growing literature on collaborative conservation.
An Illustrative Example of Collaboration
Before turning to our analysis of citizen-driven collaboration as an emergent form of democracy, it is helpful to provide an example of what we mean by citizen-driven collaboration. In 2006, the U.S. Forest Service published a draft of a new forest plan for the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest in southwestern Montana. Reactions to the draft plan were mixed. The lumber mills still operating in the area were concerned that the proposed plan would drive them out of business because it would not allow enough timber harvesting to keep their mills running, while conservationists were convinced that the plan was short on wilderness and that the proposed fish and wildlife programs were not protective enough of threatened species.
These conservationists and timber interests had a shared history of deep antagonism, in which they had typically taken diametrically opposed positions at public hearings on anything proposed by the Forest Service. They were prepared to repeat that pattern once the agency scheduled the first hearing on its draft plan. But then a few leaders from both sides, some with previous experience in collaborative problem-solving, began exploring a different approach. Representatives from five Montana lumber mills began meeting with local representatives from the National Wildlife Federation, the Montana Wilderness Association, and Montana Trout Unlimited to explore whether they might find more mutually beneficial outcomes for forest management than those being proposed by the Forest Service.
This citizen-driven collaborative effort became known as the Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership. The partners found common ground when some of the conservationists acknowledged that logging itself was not necessarily bad for wildlife and water quality, if done in the right way and at the right scale. They hammered out ways of fitting fish and wildlife restoration into a sustainable timber harvesting program. The timber interests, meanwhile, were willing to acknowledge that substantial portions of the forest should not be logged, but would better be protected as wilderness. The outcomes of this collaborative effort were eventually incorporated into legislation introduced by Senator Jon Tester and currently pending in Congress (National Forest Jobs and Recreation Act, S. 1470, 111 Congress 2nd Session).
This kind of citizen-driven collaboration has become an important, but still emerging form of democracy. We view it as a distinct form of collaboration on natural resource and environmental issues. As examined below, we believe that it is fundamentally important to make a distinction between collaborative processes that are citizen-driven (the focus here) and those that are catalyzed, convened, and organized by government (Kemmis, 2001) .
Collaboration and Democracy
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Emergence and Democracy
To understand how citizen-driven collaboration is an emerging form of democracy, it is important to begin with the concept of emergence, which derives primarily from complexity theory (Waldrop, 1992) . In this context, emergence is the process by which systems or patterns arise out of a rich multiplicity (a complexity) of relatively simple interactions. Examples of emergent structures range from hurricanes to sand dunes to a school of fish swimming or a flock of birds flying in a tight pattern, moving as one body. Complexity theorists stress that it is inherently impossible to provide in advance a rule or algorithm that will produce the structure or pattern that in fact emerges. Nothing commands the system to form a pattern. Instead, the interaction of each part with its immediate surroundings results in a complex chain of processes that eventually leads to some recognizable pattern or ordered structure. Stuart Kauffman describes the origin of life itself in these terms: "Life, in this view, is an emergent phenomenon arising as the molecular diversity of a prebiotic chemical system increases beyond a threshold of complexity. If true, then life is not located in the property of any single molecule-in the detailsbut is a collective property of systems of interacting molecules. . . . Life, in this view, is not to be located in its parts, but in the collective emergent properties of the whole they create. . . . The collective system is alive. Its parts are just chemicals" (Kaufmann, 1995, p. 24) .
Emergent or self-organizing phenomena arise in the social as well as the physical realm. Markets, for example, comprise a form of social interaction that seems to arise spontaneously out of the inescapable conditions of human being. While individual markets can be intentionally created, and while any market can be subjected to externally imposed rules and regulations, the market as a feature of human society appears and persists in history as something far more akin to self-organizing hurricanes or sand dunes than to intentionally manufactured artifacts like clocks or computers. Cities are similarly emergent, seeming to come with the territory of human society. With the city (the polis) comes another emergent form of human engagement: politics.
As with markets or cities, politics seem, at some point, to emerge naturally out of the human condition. In order to deal with the range of challenges that confront any complex human society, decision structures and power arrangements are inescapable, and certain characteristic forms of these have emerged in different settings. By the time Aristotle wrote his Politics, those forms had recurred often enough that he could create the same kind of taxonomy of politics that he had developed for many dimensions of the natural world (Aristotle, 1941) . One of those characteristic political forms (not much favored by Aristotle) was democracy. This trail of emergent forms, leading from the appearance of life itself, to human life, and eventually to the emergence of politics, continues with the long and still ongoing evolution of democracy.
In the millennia since its emergence in ancient Greece (and especially in the last two centuries), democracy has become well-established and pervasive enough to engender various characteristic forms of its own, including representative democracy, direct democracy of the town hall variety, and the kind of plebiscitory democracy manifested in referendum, initiative and recall mechanisms. As the bureaucratic state matured throughout the 20th century, it produced its own characteristic set of mechanisms for "participatory democracy," including public notice and hearings, comment periods, and administrative appeals (Dietz & Stern, 2008) . Toward the end of that century, a widening desire for more authentically engaged citizen involvement produced new, less structured forms of deliberative and collaborative democracy.
The Evolving Ecology of Democracy
Given this overview of the concept of emergence and the history of democratic theory, it is now possible to examine the emergence of citizen-driven collaboration in the context of the ecology of democracy. The intent here is to discover clues to why and how citizen-driven collaboration has made its appearance in this ecosystem, and what challenges and opportunities it may present. It is not a comprehensive history of democratic theory per se, but explores how the history of democratic theory and practice has produced the political ecosystem out of which new democratic forms (like citizen-driven collaboration) might emerge.
Democratic theory has carried hints of an ecological dimension from its inception. The very word "ecology" derives from the Greek word oikos or household, and it is with the household that Aristotle begins his study of politics. Assuming that politics is, as its name implies, simply the organized life of the polis, Aristotle argues that the household is the source of all politics and that indeed the polis was a naturally evolved (or as we might say, an emergent) collection of households or oikoi. "Hence it is evident," Aristotle writes, "that the polis is a creation of nature, and that humans are by nature political animals" (Aristotle, 1941 (Aristotle, , p. 1129 .
Athenian democracy falls far short of any standard we might set for a modern democracy, primarily because women and slaves were excluded from the process. Nevertheless, the Athenian polity was democratic in the fundamental sense that decisions were made by the assembled people, citizens controlled the entire political process, and a large proportion of citizens were involved constantly in public business. Pericles put it unforgettably in his funeral oration, following an early battle of the Peloponnesian War: "Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole people. When it is a question of settling private disputes, everyone is equal before the law; when it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of public responsibility, what counts is not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses" (Thucydides, 1972, p. 145) .
Pericles makes another argument for democracy that gets even closer to the theme of this paper. "We Athenians," he reminds his listeners, "do not think that there is an incompatibility between words and deeds; the worst thing is to rush into action before the consequences have been properly debated" (Thucydides, 1972, p. 147) . In evolutionary terms, this would amount to saying that democratic deliberation has significant survival value.
The ecological dimension of political theory became more explicit during the Enlightenment, especially when the French political theorist Montesquieu argued in his classic work The Spirit of the Laws that many forms of human society, including political forms, were fundamentally shaped by location and even by climatic conditions (Montesquieu, 1906) . Not only were political forms influenced by the places that generated them, but the republican form depended fundamentally on people in a particular place having a face-to-face relationship with one another. "It is natural for a republic to have only a small territory," Montesquieu wrote, for in that setting, "the interest of the public is more obvious, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen" (Montesquieu, 1906, p. 130 ).
Montesquieu's work deeply influenced the founders of the American republic. Both the defenders and the opponents of the U.S. Constitution agreed that the nation it established far exceeded the "small territory" that Montesquieu had prescribed. Montesquieu's authority as a political theorist was great enough that James Madison had to go to some lengths in the Federalist Papers to explain how the "extensive republic" envisioned by the Constitution could escape Montesquieu's conclusion that republicanism (read democracy) was only suitable for small states (Madison, Hamilton, & Jay, 1961) .
In fact, Montesquieu had identified a very important feature of the ecology of democracy. The Periclean ideal of direct, face-to-face democracy had been, to a large extent, re-created in the town meeting democracies of New England, where Montesquieu would undoubtedly have agreed that democracy could indeed flourish. But what the Founders and successive generations of American political leaders had to do in order to make the "extensive republic" work was to substitute for face-to-face democracy a representative form of government (already well-developed in England) wherein sovereignty was exercised by a subset of the people, chosen by the rest through the mechanism of election. Under representative democracy, elected representatives constitute the governing body or bodies, and are expected to act in the people's interest.
The problem of scale that Montesquieu had posed only deepened as the American republic followed its "manifest destiny" westward until it stretched from one coast of the continent to the other. Meanwhile, the increasing complexity of 19th century industrial and commercial society challenged the capacity of existing governing institutions to keep up. The end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries produced a number of significant adaptations to these new circumstances. The birth of the bureaucratic state was one inevitable result, with representative bodies increasingly passing regulatory responsibility to appointed officials (Hays, 1959) . This introduced a new elite into the political landscape, by giving a handful of agency experts of various kinds a much more prominent role within the governing framework.
The Progressive movement championed the cause of expertise with a vengeance, and, not surprisingly, that reliance on expertise made its presence felt in a substantive offshoot of the movement of particular interest here: the protection of millions of acres of western land from settlement, and the establishment of national jurisdiction over these public lands. Here the vectors of bureaucracy, professional expertise, and national democracy converged, in a blend that would become a major seedbed for the later emergence of a new form of democracy: citizen-driven collaboration.
As the 20th century unfolded, the bureaucracies that had begun to emerge during the previous century now spread across the governmental landscape. Efforts to keep this growing corps of unelected decision-makers accountable to the democratic polity produced a steadily thickening fabric of proceduralism as the century progressed (Sandel, 1984; Kemmis, 1990) . What is often called participatory democracy was a direct response to these developments. As legislative bodies delegated more and more decisions to government agencies, citizens began to feel shut out from those decision processes. The Administrative Procedure Act (and its state-level equivalents), and the entire structure of public notice and public hearings with which we are now so familiar, constitutes an effort to democratize the bureaucratic state by guaranteeing citizens the right to participate in this crucial range of decision-making. "Sunshine laws" and constitutional provisions guaranteeing citizens the right to know about and participate in these decisions fit in this same category of participatory democracy.
Participatory forms of democracy have only been marginally successful (Dietz & Stern, 2008) . It works fairly well in addressing the realities of a pluralistic society, in that it gives various interests (and interest groups) an assortment of opportunities to make their voices heard. It has not been nearly as successful, however, in promoting the pursuit of the common good. The procedural mechanisms of participatory democracy were designed to insure that individual or group interests had a voice; they were never designed to enable or encourage those separate voices to find or fashion common ground.
What seemed to have disappeared almost entirely from the democratic landscape of late 20th-century America was that one fundamental feature of democracy that Pericles had so proudly identified in his funeral oration: the power and effectiveness of democratic deliberation. If nature indeed abhors a vacuum, it is not surprising that this vacancy began to draw forth new life-forms, very tentatively at first, and then with increasing urgency and vitality.
One response was the development of various forms of "alternative dispute resolution." Rather than relying exclusively on judicial or administrative mechanisms to resolve disputes, some disputants began exploring the possibility of resolving them directly, face to face (although usually with the assistance of a neutral third-party facilitator or mediator) (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987) . At first, almost no one recognized these developments as having anything at all to do with democracy; they were simply new mechanisms for resolving particular disputes. But what they began to reveal was that ancient and fundamental democratic truth: given the right circumstances, ordinary people have a substantial capacity to overcome differences and discover common ground.
If the growing field of alternative dispute resolution did not immediately recognize the democratic implications of its work, another emergent set of activities was much more aware of those implications. Beginning in the early 1980s, organizations like the Public Agenda and Kettering foundations began to experiment with new mechanisms (especially the National Issues Forums) to bring the power of citizen deliberation to bear on a variety of public issues. Eventually, National Issues Forums were joined by Study Circles (now Everyday Democracy), by James Fishkin's practice of deliberative polling, and then by America Speaks, in a cascading emergence of deliberative forums (Gastil & Levine, 2005) .
Meanwhile, yet another new democratic life-form began to emerge in the open spaces left by the older, established democratic forms of representative, participatory, and direct democracy. Citizen-driven collaboration partakes of elements of alternative dispute resolution and deliberation, but it also exhibits unique features that justify its treatment as a separate species of democracy. In terms of the evolving ecology of democracy, citizendriven collaboration seems to have arisen as a direct response to some of the shortcomings of the late 20th-century framework of participatory democracy. Whatever else public hearings might accomplish, they almost never created an opportunity for anything resembling democratic problem-solving. With increasing frequency, the stakeholders who for decades had battled each other in public hearings began to engage in serious, face-to-face problem-solving work of the kind we described earlier with the example of the BeaverheadDeerlodge Partnership. What has moved so many people to take on this hard work of collaboration has been the widespread perception that, in all too many cases, the existing governing framework was proving itself incapable of getting the job done. To put it bluntly, the problems that people expected the government to solve were not getting solved.
The steadily growing number of local agreements among environmentalists, ranchers, loggers, miners and recreationists strongly suggests that participants believe that they can do better by their communities, their economies, and their ecosystems by working together outside the established, centralized governing framework (which had only taught them how to be enemies) than by continuing to rely on the cumbersome, uncertain, under-funded and increasingly irrelevant mechanisms of that old structure. In short, practical experience demonstrates that the existing decision system often cannot reconcile competing interests as effectively as the stakeholders themselves, acting on their own initiative.
In terms of the problems that democracy has sought to address throughout its history, this takes us back to Pericles' assertion that Athenians were more successful in solving problems and devising strategies because they brought many minds and diverse points of view together and took the trouble to discuss issues thoroughly before reaching a decision. Since its earliest emergence, citizen-driven collaboration has been quintessentially organic, which is why it fits so well the image of the "wetlands of democracy." While agencies now promote collaboration in a variety of ways, this democratic form has not established its foothold on the landscape at anyone's direction or by anyone's design; in its native form, it has been almost entirely undirected, and has most often occurred without any official sanction or any clear way of connecting to the existing decision structure. It is this organic, citizen-initiated form of collaboration, reflective of David Mathews' "wetlands of self-rule," that we mean when we speak of "collaborative democracy."
The Place of Collaborative Democracy
As citizen-driven collaboration emerges in the context of the ecology of democracy, it is instructive to further examine what kind of democracy it is and why it has emerged at this point in history. Practical experience and a critical review of the literature and global trends has convinced us that the one thing that has contributed most significantly to the steady expansion of citizen-driven collaboration is the fact that, in certain circumstances, it works, and in fact it works better than other available democratic mechanisms. In evolutionary terms, this is a straightforward example of natural selection: what works well survives and thrives. This principle, well established in the field of evolutionary biology, is now being extrapolated, through the discipline of sociobiology, into the social sciences under the rubric of "adaptive capacity" (Plummer & Fennell, 2007; Fennell & Plummer, 2010) . In these terms, we can see that collaborative democracy has gained a foothold in certain niches of the ecology of democracy because it has brought a kind of selective advantage to those settings.
This element of adaptiveness becomes more striking when we take account of the myriad factors that militate against collaboration. These include: a. Often parties to collaborative efforts have spent years using more adversarial means of dealing with the kinds of issues they now seek to address collaboratively. This is a new, unfamiliar, and often intimidating way of proceeding. b. It requires learning to deal in a new way with people you have spent years treating (and thinking of) as enemies. c. It subjects those who make this leap to suspicion, if not outright hostility, from other members of their own "tribe." d. Successful collaborative efforts are almost always very time-consuming. e. The established decision system rarely provides any space or encouragement for collaboration. f. Even highly productive collaborations are often overturned by that established system. The survival, and indeed the spread of citizen-driven collaboration against these odds and barriers is a vivid testament to its effectiveness. And it is in the context of this harsh, putting-to-the-test environment that the democratic credentials of collaboration have been established. People only go to all the trouble that collaboration entails because they have a real and substantial stake in the matter at hand, and presumably no better means of advancing their interests. Their work is therefore democratic in the most fundamental meaning of that word: it is the dead-serious, determined effort of people to shape the conditions under which they live, rather than leaving that shaping to someone else.
If collaboration is at its core an exercise in democratic self-determination, one important set of questions immediately arises: how does collaboration relate to other, more familiar forms of democracy?
Collaborative, Deliberative, and Direct Democracy
As mentioned earlier, collaborative and deliberative democracy are relative newcomers to the ecology of democracy. Both have the potential to contribute significantly to the practice of democratic citizenship. These two forms of democratic practice are sometimes treated as being synonymous, and indeed there is substantial overlap between them. At a minimum, collaboration cannot work without a heavy dose of deliberation. It is only by employing many of the techniques and skills of deliberation that collaborative stakeholders have any chance of finding mutually satisfactory solutions to the very challenging problems they so often take on. A clearheaded, unbiased framing of the key issues is indispensable, for example, and this often requires reframing the issue in different terms than it may have presented within the established, adversarial framework.
Collaborative efforts around contentious problems will never get off the ground unless the parties are able to hear and in some sense appreciate one another's perspectives and above all one another's core interests. Something like appreciative inquiry, then, is of fundamental importance in both deliberative and collaborative settings (Cooperrider & Whitney, 1999) . Along with it must come a genuine open-mindedness, a willingness to entertain new ideas from people you might originally have thought incapable of producing good ideas. In short, collaboration is, to a substantial extent, a deliberative practice, and one that calls to mind the advantages, both in terms of governing effectiveness and human satisfaction, that Pericles claimed for democracy.
In these terms, both deliberative and collaborative democracy stand in fairly sharp contrast to direct democracy in its most prevalent modern form of initiative and referendum. One of the most compelling criticisms of these plebiscites is the fact that they present voters with a stark, either-or choice. Either you are for the proposition as presented, or you are against it. Once an issue is placed on the ballot, it can be debated, but there is no room for deliberation or collaboration. It is true that ballot initiatives could (and occasionally do) emerge from a deliberative or collaborative process, but in most cases ballot issues are crafted by interest groups at one end of the ideological spectrum or the other, and thus become part of the adversarial political system. While deliberative and collaborative democracy are similar in some ways, and stand in a similar relationship to direct democracy, there are also significant differences between deliberation and collaboration. To understand the strengths and weaknesses of either collaborative or deliberative democracy, it is important to understand their different origins and modes of operation. One difference is reflected in the nearly universal use of the term "stakeholder" to describe the parties to collaborative efforts. This is far more than a matter of semantics; indeed it relates directly to what we have identified as the one feature of collaboration that most clearly establishes its democratic credentials. Collaboration has secured its foothold in the "ecology of democracy," against all the barriers it faces, because the people who have developed the practice of collaboration have had a real and substantial stake in the matter at hand. Those people do not operate out of a merely casual or abstract interest in the problem they are seeking to resolve. They have enough individual or group interest immediately at stake to get them to the table and keep them there. This suggests one possible difference between deliberation and collaboration, which might be framed as the distinction between discussing issues and solving problems. Collaboration is inherently focused on solving immediate, concrete problems, while deliberative democracy, at least in its early stages, has often focused on a more abstract, less action-oriented discussion of issues. As explained more fully below, the key role of stakeholders within collaborative democracy enables collaborative processes to engage more effectively with the representative system of decision making than most deliberative democratic processes have managed to do.
Collaborative, Representative, and Participatory Democracy
In light of the Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership, which is representative of many examples of citizen-driven collaboration on public lands and resources in the American West, there is an ongoing debate about how these collaborative activities fit, do not fit, or should fit into the statutorily constructed decision-making framework that has been established in this arena. One strongly held point of view has been deeply hostile to the use of collaborative processes in this field. Michael McCloskey, the longtime executive director and later board chair of the Sierra Club wrote in 1995 to his board: "A new dogma is emerging as a challenge to us. It embodies the proposition that the best way for the public to determine how to manage its interest in the environment is through collaboration among stakeholders, not through normal governmental processes" (McCloskey, 1996, p. 7) . George Coggins, a leading authority on environmental law, put the matter in equally stark terms: "The federal government is the only federal government we have. It owns the federal lands and resources and it must be responsible for allocating them in the fashion that a national majority-not a local group or partnership-deems appropriate" (Coggins, 1998, p. 30) .
In Coggins' view (and he is not alone), there is one legitimate form of democratic decision-making in this arena, namely the representative system established by the U.S. Constitution. Congress, in turn, has established certain avenues for participatory democracy in the public lands arena, including statutes like the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) (Bates Van de Wetering, 2006) . These, and the regulations adopted under them, establish clearly defined means by which any American citizen can have a say in the decision-making of the agencies that Congress has authorized to manage these public lands and resources. This process of providing input and advice to designated decision-makers, both elected representatives and appointed agency officials, is the legitimate, legally constituted framework for democratic participation in this arena. It is therefore not surprising that some people have viewed the intervention of self-appointed "stakeholders" with suspicion or outright hostility.
This resistance to the widespread use of collaboration in the public lands arena is heightened, and its democratic point is sharpened, by the often-repeated reminder that these lands and resources belong to all the people in the United States, while many of the collaborative groups seeking to resolve conflicts around the public lands are drawn from the locality in question. As George Coggins puts it: "The public lands are public. They are the property of all of the people, not just those who live in their immediate vicinity. They are national assets, not local storehouses to be looted in the deregulation riots" (Coggins, 1996, p. 213) . Coggins' hyperbole aside, the tension between duly constituted national democracy on the one hand and a largely extralegal and highly localized form of collaborative democracy on the other has to be given serious consideration. If it were not for the persistence and the frequent productiveness of these collaborative efforts, they might simply be dismissed as extraneous and corrosive to the established democratic system. But they do persist, and they persist largely because they work (McKinney & Field, 2008) . That simple fact mandates a closer look at the legal and institutional landscape within which collaboration has so aggressively established itself.
It is clear that the use of collaboration has spread so rapidly and persistently in the public land and resource arena not only because of its own frequent effectiveness, but also in large part because of what we earlier documented as the widely perceived weaknesses or outright failures of the existing decision system. If those perceptions were confined to one end of the political spectrum or the other, they might be more easily dismissed, but since collaboration, by its nature, requires the participation of a broad range of stakeholders, it is necessary to take more seriously the sometimes implicit but clearly broad-based criticism of the established system.
Turning from the genesis to the results of collaboration, public land and resource issues provide further grist for the examination of the relationship between collaborative and representative democracy. Because collaboration has often produced good results, but has frequently met resistance from the agencies that have to implement those results, it has sometimes led to the drafting and occasionally the adoption of specific legislation to mandate that implementation. A well-known example was provided by the work of the Quincy Library Group that resulted in congressional action to implement the collaborative group's work. In 2002, then Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle successfully sponsored legislation enacting the results of a similar collaboration on the Black Hills National Forest in South Dakota. Currently, Montana Senator Jon Tester is sponsoring legislation that would give statutory approval to three separate collaboratively produced forest plans in Montana. While none of this legislation has been free of legitimate criticism, it does show the potential for a fruitful intersection of collaborative and representative democracy, at least under certain circumstances.
A major factor in the success of any of this legislation has been the fact that so many varied interests, deeply committed to the results of their collaborative work, have provided the political will to secure statutory approval for that work. Both halves of this formula contribute to the result. Passion and commitment from only one end of the political spectrum will rarely carry the day, but neither will a broad consensus arising out of abstract or academic discussions. When collaboration bears fruit in the political arena, it is because it brings to that arena both the breadth of the collaborative partnerships and the fact that all the partners have so much at stake.
In spite of these examples, the translation of place-specific collaborative results into legislation remains more problematic than otherwise. One team of observers has noted, for example, that "If replicated more broadly, the place-based approach to forest management could further disaggregate the national forest system" (Nie & Fiebig, 2010, p. 3) . This concern was echoed by Undersecretary of Agriculture Harris Shermann when he testified on Senator Tester's bill to the effect that it "establishes a potentially harmful precedent because it may lead to multiple site specific legislative efforts transferring much needed resources from other units of the National Forest System where priority work must also be accomplished" (Shermann, 2009, p. 3) . This may be where collaboration could benefit from the addition of some of the well-developed forms of democratic deliberation. If the perspective of a more broadly representative, but genuinely deliberative public could be brought to bear on some of these situations, it could expand the range of public involvement without necessarily losing the problem-solving impetus that had led to the collaborative solution in the first place.
If the enactment into legislation of place-based collaborative results is both promising and problematic, another way of combining collaborative and representative democracy (namely the mandating of collaboration) is also double-edged. One of the strongest tributes to the effectiveness of collaboration in the public land and resource arena is the fact that the practice itself is often blessed, if not mandated, by both statutes and agency rules and procedures (Bates & McKinney, 2006) . One good statutory example is the Valles Caldera Trust. In 2000, Congress acquired the privately owned Baca Ranch is northern New Mexico. Instead of giving one of the existing land management agencies responsibility for this newly acquired public land, Congress mandated that "an experimental management regime should be provided by the establishment of a Trust capable of using new methods of public land management that may prove cost-effective and environmentally sensitive" (Valles Caldera Preservation Act, Public Law 106-248, 2000, p. 599). Specifically, Congress established a diverse, multi-party governing board for the land, and in effect mandated that it be managed collaboratively. Three years later, in the "Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003," Congress again called collaboration into play as it sought to "reduce wildfire risk to communities, municipal water supplies, and other at-risk Federal land through a collaborative process of planning, prioritizing, and implementing hazardous fuel reduction projects" (Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003 , Public Law 108-148, 2003 , p. 1888 .
Many other examples of statutory and regulatory mandating or encouragement of collaborative approaches to public land management could be listed, all adding up to a clear recognition that this form of problem-solving has repeatedly proven its usefulness in this arena. That usefulness is further documented by the McKinney and Field study, which concluded that the role of government is changing in the context of collaborative problem solving. While government becomes more of an enabler and resource, most collaborative groups still need government to provide resources and technical expertise and recognize that established decision-making channels-both administrative and legislative-are still the only way to implement changes in public policy (Leighninger, 2006) .
As this trend of governmental adoption of collaborative methods continues, questions persist about how readily collaboration can be transposed into settings that vary substantially from those in which it emerged. To extend the ecological metaphor a step further, these efforts to create or encourage collaborative approaches to public land and resource issues by the use of legislation or administrative practice could be viewed as the equivalent of domesticating animals or plants that had originally emerged and evolved in the wild. Useful and often lovable as these domesticated strains can be, it nevertheless remains true that a dog is not a wolf, nor a cat a tiger. Even while we promote and encourage collaboration in a number of constrained institutional settings, there are sound arguments for preserving space, and if possible native habitat, within which collaborative democracy can continue to flourish and evolve in its own organic, non-directed way.
This calls to mind once again David Mathews' evocation of the "wetlands of self-rule." One of the reasons we choose to preserve wetlands and other wildlands is that we are never entirely sure what new ecological patterns or even new life forms might emerge from them. This is surely part of what Henry David Thoreau meant when he wrote, "In wildness is the preservation of the world" (1862, p. 665). And this, once again, is the very essence of the concept of emergence: the most wonderful and adaptive patterns are the ones that organize themselves. Stuart Kauffman waxes lyrical on this subject: "For what can the teeming molecules that hustled themselves into self-reproducing metabolisms, the cells coordinating their behaviors to form multi-celled organisms, the ecosystems, and even economic and political systems have in common? The wonderful possibility . . . is that on many fronts, life evolves toward a regime that is poised between order and chaos" (1995, p. 26) .
To the extent that collaboration is a form of democracy that has emerged in response to a relatively dysfunctional decision-making framework, we should not be too eager to confine its creative energy within the bounds of that very framework. Rather, we should pay close attention to the ways in which this emergent phenomenon is manifesting its lifegiving adaptability. By studying, documenting, and nurturing that adaptive capacity, we may discover some of the most exciting work yet to be done in both democratic theory and practice.
Conclusion
If citizen-driven collaboration represents the latest successional stage in the ecology of democracy, it is useful not only to understand where and how it fits with other species within that ecology, but also to begin exploring what this type of democracy means for governance. It appears to offer some promising implications in terms of blending science and politics, mobilizing and engaging unaffiliated citizens, integrating citizen-based initiatives that operate at different spatial scales within the same landscape, and the type of leadership needed to catalyze, enable, and sustain collaborative democracy. While it may be impossible to predict with any precision what new forms of democratic governance might actually emerge, it seems clear that the better we understand the dynamics driving these developments, the better positioned we will be to encourage those most likely to advance both the cause of sound resource management and of democracy itself.
